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Abstract:  
In this paper we examine the market reaction—price and volume—to 
the appearance of a firm in the Who’s News column of The Wall Street 
Journal. We differentiate between those firms whose articles are accompanied 
by a picture of an executive and a control set of firms whose articles on the 
same day are not accompanied by a picture. The results show a more 
pronounced market reaction to the “cum picture” articles, consistent with the 
incomplete information theory of Merton [1987] and the heuristic-based 
familiarity hypothesis. There is no evidence of significant long-run abnormal 
performance for the sample firms. 
Keywords: Familiarity bias, Event study, Wall Street Journal 
Introduction 
Recent empirical evidence suggests that in many circumstances 
investors choose stocks based on behavioral heuristics and familiarity 
instead of rational strategies such as hedging and diversification. Most 
of the recent literature on the effect of familiarity on the stock 
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selection process may be considered an evolution of Merton’s [1987] 
classic paper on market equilibrium and incomplete information. 
Merton posits that an investor knows only a small portion of the total 
number of securities available in the market. More recently, Odean 
[1999] argues that investors cannot analyze the entire security 
population and thus trade securities that for some reason draw their 
attention. Barber and Odean [2006] provide evidence that individual 
investors are more likely to buy stocks that receive media coverage. 
Kaniel, Starks and Vasudevan [2006] find that news coverage can 
have a greater effect on mutual fund flow than the fund’s most recent 
performance. 
Consistent with Merton’s model, Huberman and Regev [2001] 
present a case that suggests that investors tend to trade on 
information that provides familiarity but is not “new” news. When the 
New York Times presented on its front page an article about 
Entremed’s research on a new drug that could potentially cure cancer, 
its stock rose 430% in one day, even though the news had been 
divulged in Nature and in various newspapers more than five months 
earlier.1 
The tendency of investors to purchase stocks with which they 
are familiar is known as familiarity bias. Two causes of familiarity are 
proximity (Ivkovic and Weisbenner [2005], Loughran and Schultz 
[2005], Huberman [2001], Benartzi 2001]) and brand recognition 
(Frieder and Subrahmanyam [2005], Grullon, Kanatas and Weston 
[2003]). 
Massa and Simonov [2005] distinguish between heuristic-based 
familiarity (also called “pure familiarity”) and information-based 
familiarity. Heuristic-based familiarity is consistent with psychology 
studies that show that the saliency bias affects individuals who are 
interpreting data and making decisions. This bias is the propensity to 
rely on information that is salient or often mentioned while ignoring 
information that is equally important but less visible. Alternatively, 
information-based familiarity is based on the assumption that 
investors buy and hold those securities about which they have enough 
information. Massa and Simonov [2005] state that “the portfolio 
information under information-based familiarity is observationally 
equivalent to that under exogenous portfolio constraints as information 
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about a stock affects investment decision by altering the perceived 
expected pay-off in a rational portfolio decision.” 
In this paper we test the validity of the heuristic-based 
familiarity hypothesis by making use of the laboratory provided by the 
Who’s News section of The Wall Street Journal (WSJ). Who’s News is a 
daily column of the WSJ that presents articles related to changes in 
management of U.S. firms.2 Figure 1 shows a typical Who’s News 
column. Frequently, Who’s News columns feature a picture of a top 
corporate manager who is the focus of one of the articles. Since the 
presence of a picture increases the familiarity that individual investors 
perceive regarding a particular stock but provides no information, this 
study allows us to analyze the impact of heuristic-based familiarity on 
stock selection without the confounding presence of information-based 
familiarity. 
Our analysis shows that firms that are the subject of a Who’s 
News article with a picture enjoy positive and significant abnormal 
short-horizon returns and abnormal turnover around the article date 
when compared to firms that are covered by Who’s News articles 
without a picture. These results persist even after controlling for 
differences in ex-ante visibility and information content of the news 
between firms in articles with picture and firms in articles without 
picture. We find no evidence of significant long-run abnormal 
performance for the sample firms. Our results are consistent with the 
heuristic-based familiarity hypothesis and support the presence of the 
saliency bias in investment decisions. 
Data Selection 
Sample 
We form our sample by selecting public firms that are the 
subject of a Who’s News article with a picture between January 1996 
and December 1998. In this three-year interval, this column appears 
745 times. Of these 745 columns, 185 (25%) contain at least one 
picture, and fewer than 5% of them contain two or more pictures. 
Because some of the articles accompanied by a picture discuss two 
firms, the initial sample size is 222. We eliminate from the sample four 
nonprofit organizations and 38 firms that are not available on the 
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CRSP database at the time of the article. Of the remaining 187 firms, 
38 firms are covered by more than one article. We use the firm’s first 
appearance as the event date. After removing second and third 
appearances, the final sample consists of 119 CRSP firms and 114 
Compustat firms. 
Matching Firms 
We create two control samples. To construct the first control 
sample (Control 1), we select for each sample firm a control firm 
mentioned in the same day’s Who’s News column but without a 
picture. Among these potential control firms, we choose the firm that 
is covered in an article of size comparable to the article with picture.3 
This matching strategy allows us to isolate the effect of the 
presence of a picture from the effect of the informational content of 
the article as proxied by article size. Since not all Who’s News columns 
present an article without a picture of similar size to the one with a 
picture, we cannot pair all the sample firms with matching firms. Of 
the 119 sample firms, we are able to match 60 of them. 
To construct the second control sample (Control 2), we match 
the articles with a picture with articles without a picture, independent 
of article size. Control 2 contains all the firms of Control 1 plus another 
62, a total of 112 firms. The 7 sample firms that do not have a match 
are in a Who’s News column that presents only their article. 
Control 1 is a more precise control sample since the firms are 
matched by article size and the size of the Who’s News article may be 
related to the importance of the information contained. The drawback 
of Control 1 is the small sample size. Control 2 is a larger sample but 
62 firms out of 112 are not matched by article size. 
Sample and Control Firms’ Characteristics 
In this study we measure the effect of the visibility generated by 
a picture on stock returns and turnover. However, the Wall Street 
Journal might preferentially assign a picture to a firm that is highly 
visible ex-ante. Therefore it is important to identify this possible 
source of endogeneity and to control for it. Firm characteristics that 
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are potentially related to ex-ante visibility are firm size, market-to-
book ratio, firm age, and past stock performance. We measure firm 
size as the market value of equity, calculate the market-to-book ratio 
by dividing the market value of equity by the book value of equity, 
measure firm age as the number of years since the CRSP listing 
In Table 1 we present the means, medians, and differences of 
means and medians for the sample, Control 1, and Control 2 firms. 
Control firms are significantly smaller than sample firms and 
significantly underperform compared to sample firms. The mean 
(median) market capitalization for the sample firms is $18.1 billion 
($7.1 billion), while the mean (median) market capitalization of 
Control 1 and Control 2 firms is $3.5 billion and $7.3 billion ($1.1 
billion and $1.3 billion). The mean (median) abnormal stock return of 
the sample firms for the year preceding the article is 0.19% 
(−2.77%), while the mean (median) abnormal stock return of Control 
1 and Control 2 firms is −13.86% and −13.74% (−15.06% and 
−15.65%). 
Even though the t-tests of the means and the Wilcoxon tests of 
the medians do not present any significant difference in age and 
market-to-book between the sample and the control firms, the 
significant differences in size and past performance suggest that the 
WSJ is more likely to assign a picture to a firm that is more visible ex-
ante and perform better (i.e., characterized by larger market 
capitalization and higher abnormal returns). We control for our proxies 
of ex-ante visibility in the event study regressions presented later. 
Event Studies 
Returns 
We calculate the daily abnormal returns for a single firm (𝐴𝑅)𝑖𝑡 
by subtracting the return of each matching firm (or market index) 
from the daily return of each sample firm. We obtain the cumulative 
abnormal returns (CARs) by averaging the daily abnormal returns and 
then adding the daily averages over the event period of interest. This 
method, analogous to the one applied by Cooper, Dimitrov and Rau 
[2001], is based on the assumption that the stock portfolio is 
rebalanced every period to equally weight each security. 
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We compute t-statistics to assess the statistical significance of 
the CARs by using the Brown and Warner [1985] dependence 
adjustment method with a holdout period that goes from the trading 
day −30 to the trading day −16: 
𝑡 = ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑡/√𝜎2 ∗ 𝑁
𝑚
𝑡=𝑖
 
Where 𝑖 is the first day of the event period under analysis, 𝑚  is 
the last day of the event period under analysis, 𝑁 is the number of 
trading days of the event period, and 𝜎2 is the variance of the 
abnormal returns of the holdout period. 
Table 2 shows the event study return results. The cumulative 
returns for the sample firms are positive and significant for all event 
periods examined. The cumulative abnormal returns calculated by 
subtracting the CRSP value-weighted index from the sample firm 
returns are significant at the 1% level in the five days (2.35%) and 
three days (1.77%) around the event date. 
The day before the WSJ article is possibly the day in which the 
firm announces a change in management and occasionally other 
significant news; in this case, the return of day −1 reflects the market 
reaction to this information. To control for this issue, we report the 
CAR for day 0 to day +1. The CAR for these two days (0.80%) is 
positive and significant at the 5% level. 
Removing the return of day −1 does not completely eliminate 
the confounding effect of information contained in the article and does 
not control for the increased familiarity that comes with appearing in 
the WSJ. To examine the effect of the picture independent of any 
associated information, we calculate the abnormal returns by 
subtracting the returns of the control firms from the returns of the 
sample firms. When we use Control 1, the CAR is still positive and 
significant at the 1% level for the five and three days around the 
article and positive at the 10% level for the two days starting from the 
article day. When we calculate the CARs using Control 2, the returns 
are positive and significant at the 10% level for the five and three days 
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around the article and positive but not significant for the two days 
starting from the article day. 
Overall the results presented in Table 2 show firms that are the 
subject of an article with a picture enjoy higher abnormal returns 
around the event day than firms that are the subject of a similar 
article without a picture. This evidence supports the heuristic-based 
familiarity hypothesis. 
The intermediate term cumulative abnormal returns for the first 
month after the article (from trading day 0 to trading day +21), the 
first two months after the article (from trading day 0 to trading day 
+42), and the first four months after the article (from trading day 0 to 
trading day +84) suggest that the increase in value attributable to the 
picture is not permanent. The cumulative abnormal returns are not 
significantly different from zero for the periods (+2, +15), (0, +42), 
and (0, +84). However, when we subtract the returns of Control 1 
firms form the returns of sample firms (e.g., “Sample – Control 1”), 
the intermediate term returns from day 0 to +42 and from day 0 to 
+84 are larger than the event return of day 0 to +1 (2.11% and 
2.09% versus 1.43%). This intermediate term evidence partially 
suggests the presence of a picture might have in some cases a lasting 
impact on firm value for at least four months after the article. We 
provide evidence on long–run performance (i.e., three-year buy-and-
hold abnormal returns) in Table 6. 
Returns Controlling for Ex-ante Visibility and Article 
Content 
As shown in Table 1, larger firms and firms that perform better 
are more likely to be selected by the WSJ for an article with picture. 
Moreover, it is possible that the WSJ chooses to displays pictures of 
firms that experience favorable news. In the OLS regressions 
presented in Table 3 we control for the firm-characteristic differences 
and the possible article content differences between sample and 
control firms. 
The dependent variable of our regressions is the difference in 
cumulative abnormal returns for the (0, +1) period between sample 
firms and control firms. The independent variables related to ex-ante 
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visibility (i.e., firm characteristics) are the difference between the 
logarithm of the market capitalization of sample firms and control 
firms (Size diff), the difference between the market-to-book ratio of 
sample firms and control firms (MB diff), the difference between the 
logarithm of the years since the CRSP listing date of sample firms and 
control firms (Age diff), and the difference between the abnormal 
cumulative stock return for the year preceding the article of sample 
firms and control firms (Past_Perf diff). The independent variables 
related to the information content of the article are three indicator 
variables (Event diff, Position diff, Event_CEO diff). Event diff is equal 
to one (minus one) if the article relative to the sample firm is about a 
positive (negative) event and the article relative to the control firm is 
about a negative (positive) event, and it is equal to zero if both articles 
are about positive or negative events. Positive events comprise 
promotions and new hirings; negative events comprise dismissals, 
resignations, hospitalizations, and indictments. Position diff is equal to 
one (minus one) if the article relative to the sample firm is about an 
executive in a higher (lower) hierarchical position than the executive 
presented in the article relative to the control firm, and it is equal to 
zero if the executives presented in the sample and control firm articles 
occupy the same position in their companies.4 Event_CEO diff is equal 
to Event diff if the sample or control firm article focuses on the CEO of 
the company, and zero otherwise. Event_CEO diff allows us to jointly 
control for the executive position and the event described in the 
article. 
Table 3 shows that, after controlling for our ex-ante visibility 
and information content proxies, the (0, +1) cumulative abnormal 
returns of sample firms are 1.1–1.2% higher than the cumulative 
abnormal returns of Control 2 firms and 2.1– 2.2% higher than the 
cumulative abnormal returns of Control 1 firms. The intercepts of all 
regressions are statistically significant at the 10% level. The results of 
Table 3 show the presence of a picture in the Who’s News article has a 
statistically significant positive effect on event returns above and 
beyond the effect on returns due to higher ex-ante visibility of firms 
cum-picture, as proxied by size, market-to-book, age, and past 
performance. Moreover, the results of Table 3 show the possible 
difference in the news between articles with and without pictures is not 
what drives the significant difference in abnormal returns. 
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Turnover 
To calculate the abnormal turnover around the article date we 
adopt the method suggested by Campbell and Wasley [1996]. The 
initial measure of daily turnover for each sample stock ( 𝑇𝑖,𝑡) is the 
daily ratio between number of shares traded multiplied by 100 and 
shares outstanding. To remove the skewness that characterizes 
turnover, we log-transform our raw measure of turnover after the 
addition of a constant of 0.000255.5 
We calculate abnormal turnover using the market model: 
               𝑡𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑇𝑖,𝑡 − (𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑇𝑚,𝑡)                   (1) 
where we obtain 𝛼𝑖 and  𝛽𝑖 using ordinary least squares 
estimation. We measure market volume for a given day  𝑡  (𝑇𝑚,𝑡) as 
the equally-weighted average of 𝑇𝑖,𝑡 for all the securities covered by 
CRSP in any given day. We apply the same procedure for the sample 
firms, Control 1 firms, and Control 2 firms. 
Table 4 presents the univariate tests on abnormal turnover for 
the day of the article and the two-day period starting from the day of 
the article (0, +1). Both results for day 0 and (0, +1) window show 
that the sample firms experience significant abnormal turnover. The 
mean abnormal turnover of the entire sample is 18.98% for day 0 and 
16.15% for the (0, +1) interval; both turnover measures are 
significant at the 1% level. 
The abnormal turnover of the Control 1 and Control 2 firms for 
day 0 is also positive and significant but of lower magnitude than the 
sample firms (9.50% and 6.26%). The abnormal turnover for the (0, 
+1) interval is significant for the Control 2 firms but not for the Control 
1 firms. 
The results of Table 4 also show that the sample firms 
experience significant abnormal turnover even when compared to the 
control firms. The t-tests of the difference between the abnormal 
turnover of the sample firms and the control firms (both Control 1 and 
Control 2) indicate that even controlling for the turnover of the control 
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firms, the abnormal turnover of the sample firms around the article 
date is positive and significant. The difference between the abnormal 
turnover of the sample firms and the Control 1 firms is 6.95% 
(significant at the 10% level) for day 0 and 9.77% (significant at the 
5% level) for days (0, +1). Similarly, the difference between the 
abnormal turnover of the sample firms and the Control 2 firms is 
12.45% (significant at the 1% level) for day 0 and 11.40% (significant 
at the 1% level) for days (0, +1). 
Figure 2 shows the average turnover over the six months 
around the article for the sample firms, the Control 1 firms, and the 
Control 2 firms. To calculate the daily average turnover, we divide the 
turnover of stocks traded on NASDAQ by two to correct for the double 
counting of NASDAQ stocks. The figure shows that the sample firms 
are characterized by higher turnover than the control firms for the 
entire six months around the article. In other words, firms whose 
article is accompanied by a picture are more “popular” than firms 
whose article is without a picture. However, this issue does not 
influence the results in Table 2 because we calculate abnormal 
turnover by using the market model; therefore, we control for the 
“normal” turnover of each sample and control firm. The figure also 
shows that turnover significantly increases around the day of the 
article for the sample firms but not for the control firms.6 
Overall, our tests of abnormal turnover show that the presence 
of a picture in a Who’s News article significantly increases the trading 
volume of that company’s stock. Consistent with the heuristic-based 
familiarity hypothesis, this result maintains its significance even when 
we control for the information contained in the article. 
Turnover Controlling for Ex-ante Visibility and Article 
Content 
To verify that the abnormal turnover at the time of the articles 
is not exclusively motivated by ex-ante visibility or the information 
content of the articles, we estimate OLS regressions with the 
difference of abnormal turnover between sample and control firms for 
days (0, +1) as dependent variable. As in the regressions presented in 
Table 3 the dependent variables are proxies for ex-ante visibility (Size 
diff, MB diff, Age diff, and Past_Perf diff) and the information content 
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of the article (Event diff, Position diff, and Event_CEO diff). Table 5 
presents the results. 
Table 5 shows that, after controlling for our ex-ante visibility 
and information content proxies, the (0, +1) cumulative abnormal 
turnover of sample firms is significantly higher than the cumulative 
abnormal returns of Control 2 and Control 1 firms. These results 
corroborate the univariate statistics presented in Table 4 and show 
that the presence of a picture in the Who’s News article has a 
statistically significant positive effect on turnover above and beyond 
the effect attributable to higher ex-ante visibility or more positive 
news for firms cum-picture. 
Long-Term Abnormal Returns 
Method 
In this section we analyze the long-term abnormal returns of the 
sample firms and compare them to the abnormal long-term stock 
returns of the control firms to verify if the effect of the picture in 
Who’s News articles persist in the long-term. Specifically, we examine 
whether long-term returns in the three years following the articles are 
positive and significantly different from zero. Using the CRSP daily 
database, we consider each sample firm from the month that follows 
the date of the article until the earlier of either its delisting month, or 
the third year anniversary from the month of its appearance on the 
Who’s News column. 
As noted by Fama [1998] and Mitchell and Stafford [2000], the 
buy-and-hold method does not account for cross-sectional dependence 
in returns. We address this issue by estimating three-year abnormal 
returns using the calendar-time portfolio method advocated by Fama 
[1998]. 
For each calendar month in our sample period, we form a 
portfolio of the sample firms that were the subject of a Who’s News 
article with picture during the last 36 months. We exclude those 
months with fewer than 10 firms in the portfolio. We value-weight the 
returns of the stocks in each monthly portfolio.7 We calculate calendar-
time abnormal returns using the correction proposed by Shumway 
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[1997] and Shumway and Warther [1999] to control for the returns of 
firms that delist for performance reason (i.e., bankruptcy or failure to 
meet capital requirements) during the period of interest. We impose 
−30% as the last return for NYSE and AMEX firms and −55% as the 
last return for NASDAQ firms that delist for performance reasons 
during the three years following the article. We then regress the 
monthly portfolio excess returns on the three Fama and French [1993] 
factors. 
We repeat the same procedure to calculate the portfolio 
abnormal long-term returns of Control 1 and Control 2 firms. To 
investigate if the difference of the portfolio abnormal returns between 
the sample firms and the control firms, we regress the difference in 
the monthly portfolio excess returns between the sample and Control 1 
and between the sample and Control 2 on the three Fama and French 
[1993] factors. We present the results in Table 6. 
The calendar-time regression indicates that the average 
abnormal monthly return for the full sample is 0.84%, which is 
statistically significant at the 1% level.8 The corresponding 3-year 
abnormal return obtained by earning the intercept for 36 months is 
35.1% [(1 + 0.0084)36 − 1]. 
The 3-year abnormal return for the Control 1 is 59.88% and 
statistically significant, while the 3-year abnormal return for the 
Control 2 firms is 20.87% but not statistically significant. 
The difference of the 3-year abnormal returns between the 
sample portfolio and the Control 1 portfolio is negative (−9.27%) but 
not significant. Alternatively, the difference of the 3-year abnormal 
returns between the sample portfolio and the Control 2 portfolio is 
positive (14.88%) but not significant. The lack of significance in the 
difference of the long-term abnormal returns between the sample and 
the control firms show that the effect of the picture in Who’s News 
articles does not have a long-term effect on stock performance. 
Conclusion 
Recent empirical literature shows that investors focus on stocks 
of which they are most aware. The effect of familiarity on the stock 
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selection process can be a consequence of behavioral biases or of 
differential access to information. We test the effect of familiarity on 
the stock selection process by analyzing the market reaction to the 
appearance of firms on the Who’s News column of The Wall Street 
Journal. Focusing on the articles accompanied by a picture, our test 
removes the informational dimension of familiarity and allows the 
analysis of the effect of the saliency bias on the stock selection process 
in isolation. 
We find that the “cum-picture” articles are accompanied by a 
higher short-horizon price reaction and higher turnover than articles 
“ex-picture.” These results maintain their significance even after 
controlling for proxies of ex-ante visibilities and information content of 
the articles. We find no evidence of long-horizon abnormal returns for 
the sample firms. Our results are consistent with the findings of 
Bertrand, Karlan, Mullainathan, Shafir and Zinman [2005], who 
analyze the effect of the presence of a photograph in loan solicitation 
letters. They show that a photo on a solicitation letter has more impact 
on the “take up” rate than does a lower interest rate. 
Overall, our results show that familiarity has an effect on the 
stock selection process even when it is not associated with 
information. Our study is consistent with the heuristic-based familiarity 
hypothesis. Even though in many circumstances familiarity is 
associated with an informationally efficient selection of securities 
(Massa and Simonov [2006], Ivkovic and Weisbenner [2005]), 
behavioral heuristics have significant influence on the stock selection 
process. 
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Notes 
1. On a related note, Antweiler and Frank (2004) analyze messages in 
Internet chat rooms regarding stocks. They find a significant relation 
between message activity and trading volume and message activity and 
return volatility. Tetlock [2007] studies the interactions between the 
media and the stock market using daily content from the “Abreast of the 
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Market” Wall Street Journal column. He finds that high media pessimism 
predicts downward pressure on market prices followed by a reversion to 
fundamentals. 
 
2. The Who’s News column was daily over our sample period. It became 
weekly on October 17, 2000, and resumed a daily periodicity in 2006. 
 
3. Who’s News articles belong to either one of two groups depending on size. 
Some of the articles consist of several paragraphs while others consist of 
only one paragraph. Since all the articles with pictures have more than 
one paragraph, we match the sample firms with firms covered in “multi-
paragraph” articles without pictures. 
 
4. The hierarchical order from the highest to the lowest position is: (1) CEO 
and chairman; (2) CEO; (3) chairman; (4) CFO, COO, president, or a 
combination of the three positions; and (5) vice-president, regional 
president, other top executive, or director. 
5. The addition of the constant prevents taking the logarithm of zero in days 
of zero trading volume (Cready and Ramanan [1991]). 
 
6. As a robustness check, in an unreported test we regress the difference of 
abnormal turnover between sample and control firms on the difference of 
our ex-ante visibility proxies (size, market-to-book, age, and past 
performance) between sample and control firms. The intercepts of these 
regressions are positive and statistically significant. 
 
7. The results do not significantly change when we weight the returns 
equally. 
 
8. We calculate standard errors using the quadratic spectral kernel 
recommended by Andrews [1991] to correct for heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation. 
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Figure 2: Turnover around Article Dates 
 
 
Note: This figure shows the average turnover of the 119 sample firms (‘tur’), of the 60 
Control 1 firms (‘tur control1’), and of the 114 Control 2 firms (‘tur control2’) in the 
126 trading days around the article date (day 0). 
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics – Ex-ante Visibility 
 
Note: This table presents univariate statistics on ex-ante visibility characteristics for 
sample firms, Control 1 firms, and Control 2 firms. We measure firm size as the 
market value of equity, we calculate the market-to-book ratio by dividing the market 
value of equity by the book value of equity, we measure firm age as the number of 
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years since the CRSP listing date, and we measure past performance as the abnormal 
cumulative stock return for the year preceding the article. The t-values refer to two-
sample t-tests of the mean, and the p-values refer to Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney non-
parametric tests for the median. ***, **, and * indicate two-sided significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% level. 
 
Table 2: Event Returns 
 
 
Note: This table presents the percent cumulative returns for a sample of firms that are 
the subject of Who’s News articles with picture in year 1996, 1997, or 1998. The 
cumulative returns are calculated for several event periods centered on the date of the 
article. The first row presents the raw cumulative returns for the sample firms. The 
other columns present the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) when the CRSP value-
weighted index returns, or the control firms’ returns, are subtracted from the sample 
firms’ returns. The t-statistics are reported in parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicate 
two-sided significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. 
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Table 3: Event Study – OLS Regressions 
 
 
Note: This table presents the coefficients of OLS regressions in which the dependent 
variable is the difference of cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) for the 
article day and the following day (interval [0,1]) between the sample firms and the 
matched control firms. Size diff is the difference between the logarithm of the market 
capitalization of the sample firms and control firms. MB diff is the difference between 
the market-to-book ratio of the sample firms and control firms. Age diff is the 
difference between the logarithm of the years since the CRSP listing date of the 
sample firms and control firms. Past_Perf diff is the difference between the abnormal 
cumulative stock return for the year preceding the article of the sample firms and 
control firms. Event diff is equal to 1 (−1) if the article relative to the sample firm is 
about a positive (negative) event and the article relative to the control firm is about a 
negative (positive) event, and it is equal to 0 if both articles are about positive or 
negative events. Positive events comprise promotions and new hirings, negative 
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events comprise dismissals, resignations, hospitalizations, and indictments. Position 
diff is equal to 1 (−1) if the article relative to the sample firm is about an executive in 
a higher (lower) hierarchical position than the executive presented in the article 
relative to the control firm, and it is equal to 0 if the executives presented in the 
sample and control firm articles occupy the same position in their companies. 
Event_CEO diff is equal to Event diff if the sample or control firm article focuses on the 
CEO of the company, and 0 otherwise. The t-statistics are reported in parenthesis. 
***, **, and * indicate one-sided significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. 
 
Table 4: Abnormal Turnover 
 
Note: This table shows the results of univariate tests on abnormal turnover. The initial 
measure of daily turnover for each sample stock ( 𝑇𝑖,𝑡) is the daily ratio between 
number of shares traded multiplied by 100 and shares outstanding. We log-transform 
this raw measure of turnover after the addition of a constant of 0.000255. We 
calculate abnormal turnover using the market model: 𝑡𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑇𝑖,𝑡 − (𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑇𝑚,𝑡) where  𝛼𝑖  
and 𝛽𝑖 are obtained via ordinary least squares estimation. The market volume measure 
for a given day 𝑡 (𝑇𝑚,𝑡) is measured as the equally weighted average of 𝑇𝑖,𝑡 for all the 
securities covered by CRSP in any given day. We apply the same procedure for the 
sample firms, Control 1 firms, and Control 2 firms. The sample is formed by 119 CRSP 
firms that are the subject of a Who’s News article with picture between January 1996 
and December 1998. The 60 Control 1 firms are the subjects of Who’s News articles 
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without picture of size comparable with the size of the articles with picture of the 
sample firms. The 112 Control 2 firms are the subjects of Who’s News articles without 
picture of size of any size. The seven sample firms that do not have a match are the 
ones that are in a Who’s News column that present only their article. Panel A reports 
the results for the three days around the article date (event days –1, 0, and +1). ***, 
**, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
 
Table 5: Abnormal Turnover – OLS Regressions 
 
Note: This table presents the coefficients of OLS regressions in which the dependent 
variable is the difference of abnormal turnover for the article day and the following day 
(interval [0,1]) between the sample firms and the matched control firms. Size diff is 
the difference between the logarithm of the market capitalization of the sample firms 
and control firms. MB diff is the difference between the market-to-book ratio of the 
sample firms and control firms. Age diff is the difference between the logarithm of the 
years since the CRSP listing date of the sample firms and control firms. Past_Perf diff 
is the difference between the abnormal cumulative stock return for the year preceding 
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the article of the sample firms and control firms. Event diff is equal to 1 (−1) if the 
article relative to the sample firm is about a positive (negative) event and the article 
relative to the control firm is about a negative (positive) event, and it is equal to 0 if 
both articles are about positive or negative events. Positive events comprise 
promotions and new hirings, negative events comprise dismissals, resignations, 
hospitalizations, and indictments. Position diff is equal to 1 (−1) if the article relative 
to the sample firm is about an executive in a higher (lower) hierarchical position than 
the executive presented in the article relative to the control firm, and it is equal to 0 if 
the executives presented in the sample and control firm articles occupy the same 
position in their companies. Event_CEO diff is equal to Event diff if the sample or 
control firm article focuses on the CEO of the company, and 0 otherwise. The t-
statistics are reported in parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicate one-sided significance at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. 
 
Table 6: Three-Year Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns 
 
Note: This table presents calendar time portfolio abnormal returns obtained by using 
the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model: 𝑅𝑝,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝑏(𝑅𝑚,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡) + 𝑠𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 +
ℎ𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝜀𝑝,𝑡. We correct the standard errors of the regressions for heteroskedasticity 
and autocorrelation using the quadratic spectral kernel as suggested by Andrews 
[1991]. The implied abnormal return (“implied AR”) is the estimated average buy-and-
hold return obtained from earning the intercept return for 36 months [(1 +
𝛼
100
)
36
− 1]. 
We obtain the calendar time portfolio abnormal returns using Shumway [1997] 
correction for firms that delist for performance reasons. The t-statistics are reported in 
parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level.  
